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Drawing the Lines: health scares in the age of SARS 
Claire Hooker (2008) 
 
‘It's really just a question of where people are going to draw the lines.’ Dr Alison 
McGreer, 20031 
 
‘[T]here is also a kind of international biopolitics that governs the movement, transitions, 
settlement and repatriation of various populations – including refugees, migrants, guest 
workers, tourists and students. This international biopolitics is a condition of the 
assignation of populations to states and thus of social government of any form.’ Mitchell 
Dean, Governmentality, 19992  
 
‘What issues of public health and surveillance, we may ask, emerge in the wake of 
September 11th and the subsequent threat of bio- terrorism? How, moreover, might 
epidemics of fear if not disease be sociologically explained and understood?’  Stephen 
Williams, From Smart Bombs to Smart Bugs, 20033 
 
Introduction: Risk, health and borders 
 
Epidemics of fear, perhaps also of disease: here are some important foci for our present 
anxieties. By ‘us’ I mean the various academics, experts and professionals, who in the 
‘western’ nations of North America, Europe and Australia have ongoing conversations 
on these subjects. Some health professionals are worried about a vast outbreak of a 
new or re-emerging infectious disease; others are worried about being deliberately 
attacked with disease or with deadly gas. But also, many health professionals worry 
about the enormous impacts that these public fears may have on economies and 
societies: ‘the problem with SARS,’ I have heard several in Canada say, ‘was not SARS 
itself, but fear’. They meant that the disruptions of SARS were vastly disproportionate to 
 2 
its body count, a mere 44 deaths, and I know they recall, and would like to prevent, 
other situations where public worries unjustified by scientific evidence (say, of radiation 
from powerlines)4 caused trouble and expense. Yet they seem to make little 
professional effort to trace the tensions between their fears and their fears of fear.5 And 
so we who observe public health from the humanities worry and wonder about their 
(our) worrying: is ours a ‘risk society’,6 a ‘culture of fear’?7 
 
In this chapter I will join these conversations to reflect on current concerns about, and 
responses to, the threats of infectious disease. First, I will situate these concerns and 
reactions in a more general context of concerns about ‘health scares’ – social, as 
opposed to individual, phenomena, wherein we see a strong reaction to a specific event 
that appears to threaten the health of some significant social group. This is not the 
problem of disease but of ‘fear itself’, in the terms used above. I then briefly discuss 
concerns with epidemics of new and re-emerging infectious diseases as a particular 
category of health scare. Here I remind the reader of the central role that real borders, 
and conceived boundaries, play in these concerns: nation states remain the basic units 
for preventing and managing disease events, and they produce instrumental categories 
(like ‘susceptible’ or ‘infectious’) whose crossings are cause for concern.8 I argue that 
this may be understood in terms of the logic of dangerousness outlined by Foucault, 
and, after him, Castel,9 and that this logic has been reasserted amid contemporary ideas 
of information flow and of risk.  With all this in mind, I then retell the story of SARS in 
Canada, to show how containment strategies such as quarantine, policing air travel and 
hospital boundaries, and hygiene messaging, which had vast, largely negative social and 
economic impacts, were determined by the tensions between these logics of 
dangerousness and risk. Whether one quarantined newly adopted Chinese children or 
the nurse in a hospital with SARS patients,10 whether one spent money on thermal 
scanners in airports or on hospital emergency wards, such decisions depended, given 
these logics, on where one chose to ‘draw the line’. 
 
The idea that there has been a shift in the basic logic of public health from 
dangerousness to risk was elaborated in an article by Robert Castel, who argued that 
until the mid to late twentieth century the central logic of public health governance was 
one of ‘dangerousness’, in which authorities had to try to identify and neutralise, one by 
one, any threats to health.11 He considered that many of the techniques of surveillance 
that Foucault identified in earlier periods were at basis engaged with examining each 
individual for signs of dangerousness so that they could be disciplined or excluded. 
These strategies were limited: firstly, because of the difficulties of locating the 
dangerous, who, prior to doing those things health authorities wished to prevent, such 
as committing a crime or transmitting an illness, very often did not show external signs 
of their threat, and secondly because once identified, they could only be dealt with one 
by one. Even Nazi eugenics, for all its focus on the concepts of population, was in fact 
the logic of dangerousness writ large, the Final Solution being an attempt to neutralise 
all individuals belonging to particular classes of ‘dangerous people’. The terrible scale of 
the Holocaust was based on the belief that the modern state, with its extensive 
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resources and bureaucratic machinery, could actually accomplish this elimination of 
danger. 
 
Afterwards, as new concepts of population and health rose to replace the discredited 
ones of racial fitness, Castel thought that the logic of intervention came to be based on 
the calculation of abstract factors - a logic of risk. This move overcame both the 
limitations of the logic of danger. Instead of scrutinising each person for signs of danger, 
one merely calculated combinations of risk factors in the population and designed 
interventions for the resulting, newly ‘identified’, at-risk groups. This was the basis for 
the rise of the ‘new public health’ at this time, an approach that required that all people 
exercise a disciplined and responsible autonomy in identifying and correcting those 
factors that placed them at risk of ill health.12 It was not lost on commentators that the 
‘new public health’ was valorised at the very time that public health funding (and, as a 
result, infrastructure), were cut in the entrepreneurial Eighties and pragmatic Nineties.  
 
In an article written a few years back, I argued that the infection control strategies of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were centred around concepts of 
cleanliness that lay at the heart of ‘sanitary’ public health, and were focused on locating 
and neutralizing all instances of dirt, in fact, every single bacterium.13 Part of this 
process was a brief but fervent attempt to locate, cleanse and control every healthy 
‘carrier’ of dangerous, disease-causing bacteria. I argued that as these strategies failed 
and as issues of population health became more dominant in the early twentieth 
century, the first risk based public health strategies (mass immunization and the 
compulsory pasteurization of milk) came into being. To be sure, they were still strategies 
for eliminating, not merely managing, risk – but their basic logic had shifted, focusing 
now on population and not on the individual. In this chapter I wish to extend this 
argument to contemporary times, and rethink it in the light of the perceived resurgence 
of ‘old’ containment methods in the age of SARS.   
 
In the logic of dangerousness, and the practices and instrumentalities developed in that 
period, borders and boundaries were absolutely central. Bashford has explained how the 
boundaries of government have been manifested as and through what she calls ‘lines of 
hygiene’, a designation that allows us to conceptually link the various practices of 
detention, segregation, isolation, quarantine, seclusion and bodily purification and 
management that have been the primary instruments of disease control for most of the 
past two centuries.14 Public health has been critical in the imagining and policing of 
‘borders’, which I take to refer to the edges of one political entity from another, for 
example in the various quarantine and immigration restriction acts that excluded 
unwanted (ie, dangerous) others. As Dean remarks above, biopolitics – of which power 
these public health strategies were but one expression – is predicated on nationhood, 
which is significantly conceived of and managed through measures to secure its 
health.15  
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Boundaries were key to the more complicated public health strategies of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, which sought to define and separate the clean from the 
dirty, the immune from the susceptible, the infectious from the benign - categories that 
applied to people, objects, and spaces. Lines of hygiene produced boundaries of 
differing durations that circumscribed the movement and behaviour of individuals and 
produced new kinds of identities.16  They also produced new anxieties. We know from 
many scholars of public health in this period that boundary crossings, and aberrant 
identities that defied the neat, polar separation of opposing categories, were identified 
as sites requiring special policing and control.17 Sexualities that trangressed the 
boundaries of gender, deformities, emissions or wounds that violated the boundaries of 
the body, products and viruses that crossed the boundaries between species, entities 
that had promiscuous contact with unknown others - these defined dangerousness in 
the past.18 To a large degree they still do today - though it may be that these days we 
are far more interested in the crossings than we are in the boundaries. As the story of 
SARS shows, we are in many ways all too aware that border crossings can and will take 
place, and afraid, as cultural critic Meaghan Morris suggested,19 both of boundaries that 
are too restrictive, and of having no boundaries at all. 
 
SARS drew sudden and close attention to the fact that even if border crossings have 
become a common and often desirable feature of a globalising world, they are also sites 
of high anxiety and primary locations for government scrutiny and intervention. Of 
course this was already obvious from the September 11 2001 terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Centre (‘9/11’) and the aftermath of national security and invasion, a 
context self consciously referred to by Canadians during and after SARS. Security 
concerns have seen a return to logics of infection control that are routed in old notions 
of boundaries and older instruments invested in national borders. Yet there is also a 
transition to new metaphors and instruments that are about information flow and 
surveillance, one version of the logic of risk. I think that the two are in necessary, 
constant and dynamic interaction with each other, and that their relation can and 
should be historicized in this light. The ‘new public health’ really does take place, it 
seems, in a ‘risk society’ where catastrophes, real and as-yet-unrealised, have a huge 
impact on both the actual instruments of public health, and on the logics of their 
implementation. One sign of this risk society is a new phenomenon, the health scare. 
 
II. Health Scares 
 
‘Like a haunted house the morning after Halloween, many a bloodcurdling health hazard 
looks less frightening in the daylight of follow-up studies than it did in the first shriek of 
publicity.’ Avery Comoraw, Less Than Scary Health Scares: Killer Cranberries?, 200020  
 
‘In U.S., Fear Is Spreading Faster Than SARS’ New York Times Banner Headline, April 17, 
200321  
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Public health responses to SARS can only be fully understood as part of a set of those 
wider concerns to which I referred in the opening paragraph. Public health professionals 
are today afraid, both of potential catastrophes (as for example from epidemic disease), 
yet also of the consequences of our being so fearful. In particular they worry about 
highly damaging public reactions, such as ceasing to eat beef or suddenly discarding 
medication or changing their travel plans, to imagination-grabbing risks that are actually 
extremely small. In this section I argue that a new phenomenon has been born from this 
tension: health scares. Since the subject has not yet attracted scholarly analysis,22 in this 
section I offer some evidence about what kind of social phenomenon health scares are. 
 
Health scares are a new, social phenomenon, a powerful construction that represents 
new preoccupations with risk and security and influences the playout of real events. A 
brief search using the term ‘health scare’ on electronic indexes shows that colloquially 
at least, there is a widely accepted concept of ‘health scares’ as bounded events in 
which a group of people hold significant fears for their health. This search collected 56 
news articles, many of which contained the term ‘health scare’ in their titles, and 160 
publications in scholarly and professional literatures. The overwhelming majority of 
articles in both categories were published in the mid to late 1990s. As the earliest 
studies in the scholarly/professional collection were published in the early 1970s, this 
indicates that our preoccupation with health scares is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Moreover, although one news article contained references to health controversies from 
the 1950s and 60s,23 all the health scares discussed in the scholarly/professional 
literature occurred in the period after 1970. This period has also seen the growth of 
scholarly and professional attention to emergency preparedness and planning. 
 
Significantly, health scares are a ‘first world’ phenomenon. I don’t mean that disease 
outbreaks, industrial accidents, hysterical panics etc don’t happen elsewhere: of course 
they do. I mean that geographically they were overwhelmingly reported from North 
America, the United Kingdom, continental Europe and Australia. Notably, aside from 
one report of a disastrously handled outbreak of cholera in Italy in 1973,24 the search 
found no reports of devastating disease in the developing world described as ‘health 
scares’, with the exception of allusions to HIV/AIDS in some articles. Disasters still 
happen in the third world, health scares in the first.  
 
Health scares are mostly though not always scares in the sense that fears have greatly 
exceeded actual mortality. All health scare events discussed in the sample could be 
classified according to three fears/outcomes profiles: A: Fears of large scale destruction 
but with low actual mortality (so far):25 eg BSE,26 inhalation anthrax,27 SARS, or radiation 
from powerlines and mobile phones masts;28 B: Crises, where severe outcomes more or 
less matched fears: eg contamination of food and water,29 and HIV/AIDS;30 C: Low fears 
and low outcomes: these were al reports of risks of pharmaceutical products. As the 
numbers of people using these products, and hence potentially at risk, were often very 
large, yet the risk later turned out to be even small than expected, C may be regarded as 
a subset of A. 
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Finally, although they seem unreal because of their low mortality rates, virtually all 
health scares have commanded attention and concern from journalists and health 
professionals because of the all-too-real economic cost and social disruption that they 
have caused. The two are intertwined, of course: often the ‘problem’ was not so much 
that people ceased eating cranberries or beef, or even that they ceased using oral 
contraceptives mid-cycle or pulled their child out of a school built near powerlines – in 
any case most of these behaviour changes were fairly short lived – but the enormous, 
sometimes devastating, impact these actions had on industries and the communities 
they sustained. And, while local consumer behaviour has been significant in generating 
many of these impacts, it was often trade embargoes and drops in tourism that did most 
of the damage.31 Consider BSE: it was the context of international trade that made this 
the costliest health scare the world has ever seen.32 The trade embargoes first put in 
place by France as a kind of quarantine, and then strategically implemented elsewhere 
(as Canada found to its cost in 2003) bound notions of health to national identity and 
economic power. Trade barriers have to a large extent become the lines of hygiene of 
the market-driven, deregulated new world order of the late twentieth century, lines 
that mark nations as pure or as contaminated. Amid an effectively global, 
interconnected economy, health scares reassert the validity of borders: prosperity is 
equated with security, which decodes to border control for health.  
 
Health scares are events typically characterised by large-scale fears but very low actual 
mortality and morbidity. As a recent feature of late twentieth century western societies, 
their existence supports the contention of ‘risk society’ theorists that we have become 
very anxious about the intrusion of those catastrophes to which we - as opposed to 
those ‘Others’ in the ‘third world’  - have hitherto felt immune.33 This is the context in 
which responses to infectious disease are created. Health scares are ‘problems’ (as in 
my opening quotation, ‘the problem with SARS…’) because of their devastating 
economic (which means, social) consequences. This means that health and economic 
concerns must be regarded as interdependent and as shaping one another: one cannot 
understand responses to, and reflections on, SARS, for example, without understanding 
these connections. Finally, the economic context clearly demonstrates the tensions 
between the globalising, border-crossing tendencies in economic systems, and the 
reification of nationhood, of national economies held and patrolled within national 
borders. This tension operated in responses to contemporary concerns with infectious 
disease also. 
 
III. Disease Scares: Pandemics 
 
"In a world where diseases respect no borders, it is important that we cooperate across 
borders internationally as well." Canadian Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh to the United 
Nations, November 17, 200434  
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‘Our plan of action is designed to recognize that, in this age of global travel and 
interaction, infectious disease control is paramount to the health of our communities.’ Dr 
James Young, Ontario Commissioner for Public Security, May 19 200335  
 
‘Planning and preparedness before the next pandemic strikes – the inter-pandemic 
period – is critical for an effective response … [preparation] has been done through 
programs … focused more generally on increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and 
other emerging infectious disease health threats.’ United States of America Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness 
Plan, 200436  
 
Among the panoply of health scars, there is a special place reserved in our cultural 
imagination for fears of a mass outbreak of disease. This is attested to by filmes such as 
Virus and Outbreak and novels like Robin Cook’s Contagion. When I asked Canadian 
health professionals and policymakers for examples of health scares, they typically 
thought first of Ebola, West Nile virus, Norwalk, meningococcal disease, clostridium 
difficile, SARS, avian influenza, monkeypox.  
 
Above all, right now, the concern is pandemic influenza, defined as an ‘explosive global 
event in which most, if not all, persons worldwide are at risk for infection and illness’.37 
Health professionals and policymakers will tell you: the issue is not whether there will 
be another global experience of pandemic influenza, but when it will happen, and how 
bad it will be. ‘During the last few years, the world has faced several threats with 
pandemic potential, making the occurrence of the next pandemic just a matter of time,’ 
says the World Health Organization (WHO)’s website.38 Accompanied by well-publicised 
exhortations from the WHO, western nations like Canada, the US and Australia have 
prepared pandemic influenza preparedness plans, publicly stating strategies on 
everything from vaccine manufacture and stockpiling to data collection and 
management systems. Everyone’s saying: ‘remember 1919’. (These memories have 
caused at least one major health scare in the U.SA. in the past.39 Similarly, embedded 
assumptions and expectations about pandemic influenza strongly influenced responses 
to SARS.) 
 
One key feature of our current anxiety with infectious disease is encapsulated in the 
reiterated phrase ‘disease has no borders’.40 We are constantly told that we need to be 
prepared, to build new institutions, implement new procedures, because we are living in 
a world where diseases respect no borders. On the face of it, this phrase is a little 
puzzling. What other kind of world have we ever lived in? The phrase indicates a 
perception of recent change among health professionals, who look back with nostalgia 
to some brief, halcyon period (the 1960s and 1970s, perhaps?) when infectious disease 
control was so well accomplished that it was no longer the central plank of public 
health. Circulatory system disorders and cancers do stay nicely within bodily, local and 
national boundaries and are governed more or less satisfactorily through the logics of 
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risk; epidemics have recently been confined to the ‘third world’. Now health 
professionals consciously warn each other and the public that various social, technical 
and environmental changes, of which the most commonly cited is widespread air 
travel,41 mean that infectious disease can no longer be kept within boundaries.  
 
The phrase also evokes those modernist anxieties about transgressions that I mentioned 
above - the theme, common in stories of health scares, that danger results either from 
nature’s capacity to elude the artificial boundaries that humans construct, or from 
human violation of ‘natural’ boundaries. Our fears are of a novel situation in which we 
are threatened by literally new disease-causing entities (like SARS or prions) and by old 
diseases in new forms. We believe that this situation has arisen because of our 
contemporary boundary crossings - the rapid movement of peoples and organisms, 
agricultural and industrial practices that constantly cross boundaries between species. 
These deep, old anxieties about new dangers speak to metaphors distinct from expert 
concerns with miscalculations of risk, which are also present in pandemic preparedness 
planning. 
 
Borders are meaningless to a microbe, but our security is perceived to rely on our 
requiring microbes to respect them anyway. (Hence the conceptual and practical 
entanglement of bioterror – which attacks a state – and influenza preparedness, as 
shown in the HSS quotation above.) Our first move in combating new and re-emerging 
infectious diseases has been to double the guard: to put in place more extensive and 
rigorous quarantine and border screening regimens, to examine prospective immigrants 
and exclude those believed to harbour illness, to identify, cordon off and patrol 
dangerous places in the world. Pandemic influenza preparedness at times seems almost 
wholly defined by the patrol of borders, as scientists watch the virus cross species, then 
cross the overcrowded urban centers of the third world, and finally cross from the third 
world to the first. The notion of a ‘pandemic’ itself is defined by the travelling of a 
disease: the WHO’s stages of pandemic alert are built around a disease’s geographical 
movement.42 One outcome is central and explicit preoccupation in influenza 
preparedness planning with travellers by air, who are identified as a special population 
in need of careful surveillance and regulation.  
 
Yet while these classic segregationist strategies and ideas are important in 
contemporary pandemic preparedness planning, the metaphors and practices of risk are 
central also. If border patrol is important, information flow across borders is equally so. 
Emergency preparedness planning for infectious disease events is vested in nation 
states - but is equally importantly managed through global systems and institutions, 
above all the WHO. At this level the strategies of managerial risk calculation and 
surveillance are primary, and they shape how, where and with what consequences 
borders are policed on the ground. Though they are sometimes in tension, the logics of 
risk and of danger together are productive of, and shape responses to, health scares 
involving infectious disease. 
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IV. SARS: An Epidemic 
 
‘At noon, his chief of staff announced that the hospital's own doctors and nurses had 
begun filling up the emergency wards--as patients. They reported trouble breathing, 
severe muscle pain and high fever. Their mystery illness wasn't responding to treatment. 
The healthy staff took to dressing from head to toe in protective gear. To avoid infecting 
his family, Cockram kept to a separate bedroom and wore a surgical mask at home. 
Many of his colleagues slept in their offices. In a few days, the wards filled up with more 
than 90 patients. "It was heartbreaking," he says. "This was a new disease, and we didn't 
know what to do. We felt so helpless."’ Dr Clive Cockram of the Prince of Wales Hospital, 
Hong Kong, quoted in Tracking a Killer Virus, Newsweek, April 7, 200343  
 
‘Handwashing was transformed from an irregular and absent-minded habit to a 
necessity carried out frequently and deliberately. The proper technique had to be 
learned, since we had scarcely realized the intricacy of the process. Seven steps in all, 
continued for at least 15 seconds, making sure that the thumb, the web spaces and the 
nails were not missed.’ Drs Michael Schull and Donald Redelmeier remember SARS in 
the Canadian Medical Association Journal, July 22, 200344  
 
What were the logics of risk and danger in operation during the course of the outbreak 
of SARS in Toronto, Canada? What kinds of anxieties were mustered around SARS as a 
health scare? What kinds of practices were mobilized for its containment, and what 
assumptions and expectations were at work during the course of the outbreak and its 
immediate aftermath? 
 
To public health officials SARS represented the return of an experience that most in the 
West had consigned to a past beyond memory – a swiftly spreading outbreak in the 
general community of an epidemic disease with a significant mortality rate, and no 
vaccine or specific cure. Canadians had not experienced an epidemic crisis since polio in 
the mid twentieth century (whatever fears were entertained of HIV/AIDS, its 
transmission and illness rates were sufficiently slow as to plan interventions and 
treatment). SARS’ method of transmission was poorly understood, but its threat was all 
too easily imagined, mentally filtered through images of makeshift Spanish Influenza 
hospitals, crowded diphtheria wards, hospital rooms full of iron lungs.  
 
Under these circumstances, the SARS outbreak in Toronto saw the whole-hearted return 
to the logic of dangerousness. Responses were focused squarely on hunting for and 
isolating dangerous individuals and things. The instruments of segregation and hygiene - 
– quarantine, isolation, exclusion, disinfection - were writ large in an attempt to 
accomplish this feat. This return was necessary. Although Castel is right to point out the 
limits of the logic and practices of dangerousness in governing the health of a 
population overall, the logic and practices of risk surveillance, obtaining information and 
from it defining risk factors and calculating risk, are equally too limited temporally and 
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logistically to respond to a crisis situation, such as SARS. But how necessary this was 
remains a matter of debate as stakeholders reflect on the consequences of the 
containment measures used. Where should the lines have been drawn? 
 
To understand why particular containment strategies were used I follow the story of 
SARS in Toronto as health professionals and policymakers have told it.45 The story is 
structured by the tension between the impossibility, yet necessity, of monitoring a 
nearly infinite multitude of potentially dangerous objects and people. Rather than 
calculations of risk, it revolves around the unpredictable, the contingent, coincidence. In 
this story the scary thing, reiterated in event after event, is how momentary, 
coincidental contact between people and objects that no one suspected were 
dangerous generated outbreak after outbreak of a deadly disease.  
 
The story begins with the failure of risk-based public health – the failure of surveillance. 
Canada’s much publicised Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) received a 
Chinese-language report of an influenza outbreak in mainland China in November, 2003 
- but it was never translated. On February 14 2004, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) reported in its weekly newsletter the occurrence of an outbreak of an unusual 
acute respiratory illness, thought by the Chinese authorities to be atypical pneumonia, 
in Guangdong province. By February 21 ProMED-Mail, an internet reporting system, 
noted that only two tissue samples from deceased patients in Guangdong had shown 
evidence of the pneumonia bacterium, and that the illness might not be pneumonia at 
all. This too passed without commentary, in part because the Chinese government 
suppressed information about the extent of the outbreak at this stage.46 
 
Travellers, and cross-species influenza viruses, were and remain the model for a 
pandemic outbreak of respiratory illness, informing what information was identified as 
relevant and what was not. On February 14 officials in Hong Kong had reported a case of 
avian influenza. On February 19 Health Canada recommended that all provinces be 
vigilant for influenza-like illnesses in travellers returning from Hong Kong or China, and 
had issued a written statement to the Pandemic Influenza Committee, the Council of the 
Chief Medical Officers of Health, the Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network, the 
FluWatch network (including hospital infection control practitioners), and veterinarians, 
warning all recipients to be alert for avian flu. No further warnings were issued, and the 
disease was not identified as new by Canadian officials or health care providers.47 
 
A single moment of coincidental contact and interaction allowed the disease to spread. 
A doctor who had treated patients with atypical pneumonia in Guangdong then 
travelled to Hong Kong to attend a wedding, staying in the Metropole Hotel, where he 
became unwell and infected at least 12 other people. One was an elderly Toronto 
woman who became ill two days after her return home, and who died at home on 
March 5th of apparently normal causes. On March 7th her 44 year old son, Mr K., arrived 
in the emergency waiting room of a major Toronto hospital, Scarborough Grace, with 
high fever and difficulty breathing. He shared the open observation ward of a busy 
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emergency department for 18 to 20 hours while awaiting admission. He was later 
admitted to intensive care, where he required intubation. Though he was later isolated 
(on suspicion of tuberculosis), many patients, staff and visitors were exposed to him. He 
received oxygen and vaporized medications, which are potentially capable of 
transforming infectious droplets into an infectious aerosol. Health professionals in 
Toronto were thus ‘taken completely by surprise’ by SARS, for though by March 13 the 
WHO had issued a global alert about the mysterious illness (characterized as primarily 
affecting health care workers in Hanoi and Hong Kong, where it has spread to several 
hospitals), physicians in Toronto were not formally advised of it. However it was not 
long before Toronto epidemiologists ‘connected the dots’ themselves.48 
 
As the story of SARS in Toronto progresses, the emphasis remains on its terrifying 
contingency, eluding control because it was transmitted by people and objects not 
suspected to be dangerous. Mr K died and his family, now ill, were isolated in negative 
pressure rooms in various Toronto hospitals, but the disease continued to spread. All 
kinds of people were infected (‘his wife infected seven visitors to the emergency 
department, six hospital staff, two patients, two paramedics, a firefighter, and a 
housekeeper’) and all kinds of equipment became suddenly suspect (‘the physician who 
intubated Mr. P in the ICU wore a mask, eye protection, gown, and gloves while 
performing the procedure, but he developed SARS’).49 A new cluster of cases occurred 
at yet another hospital when an unrecognized SARS patient was treated there for 
apparent myocardial infarction. The committee of senior physicians and medical officers 
for health that advised the Ontario government about infection control measures during 
the outbreak, already fearful that they were witnessing ‘another 1919’, were 
particularly worried by the March 30 outbreak of 324 SARS cases amongst residents of 
vertically linked apartments in a Hong Kong complex. Started by a single resident’s 
casual contact with a SARS patient, this outbreak led the advisory committee to believe 
they were witnessing fast-paced community spread, with transmission adaptive to 
varying circumstances. Their worst fears were confirmed on April 12 when a cluster of 
cases occurred in a Toronto Catholic sect.  
 
Since danger seemed, potentially, everywhere and catastrophe was genuinely feared, 
the advisory committee recommended containment measures on an enormous scale. 
On March 26, with one hospital (Scarborough Grace) closed, all negative pressure rooms 
in the city in use, and 10 infected hospital staff waiting for admission while others 
waited to be examined, a state of emergency was formally declared. The containment 
measures were no different to those invoked against the infectious diseases of a century 
earlier. First, basic hygiene - hand washing and handkerchief use - was emphasised as 
the primary forms of prevention that every Canadian should undertake. Secondly, 
situations of mass contact were avoided. Some schools closed – for example, one in 
Scarborough closed after a nurse’s child exhibited symptoms. Excursions were 
cancelled. At Easter, the Ontario Department of Health sought and received the 
cooperation of religious leaders, requesting they place communion wafers in hands 
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rather than in mouths, refrain from using a common cup, hold confessions outside 
booths, and have parishioners exchange smiles rather than kisses or handshakes.  
 
Thirdly, quarantine was used as a primary containing mechanism, and was imposed on 
close to 30 000 people in Toronto.50 Anyone who had entered the affected hospitals 
after March 16 was asked to adhere to a 10 day home quarantine. Attendees of funerals 
were sent into quarantine; when an employee of a large information technology firm 
broke quarantine and returned to work with respiratory symptoms, two hundred fellow 
employees were sent into home quarantine; when screening picked up a fever in a 
nurse caring for SARS patients, all the passengers who shared her train carriage that day 
were identified for possible quarantine. There were two levels of quarantine: 10-day 
home quarantine, and 10 or more day ‘work’ quarantine where those affected could 
move between their workplace and their home, but go nowhere else. In addition, many 
of those in quarantine self-imposed extra barriers between themselves and their family, 
sleeping in basements and preparing and eating food alone.51  
 
In point of fact, of course, the epidemic was almost wholly confined to health care 
settings, and those primarily affected were exposed and vulnerable patients and health 
care workers. That led to an unprecedented focus on health care settings, especially 
hospitals, which were suddenly identified as dangerous places instead of as sanctuaries. 
Hospitals across Ontario - well outside the affected area - ceased undertaking non-
emergency procedures, and closed their doors to visitors. Their borders were patrolled – 
sometimes literally by police, but at all times by staff who were deputed to temperature 
screen all those who entered their doors and to require handwashing in alcohol based 
antiseptic. Within, hygiene protocols received minute scrutiny. Particular life-saving 
practices such as intubation became identified as immensely risky for the physicians 
performing them. Standard protective clothing protocols quickly became double gown 
and glove. Health care workers worried anyway that they might contaminate 
themselves or others as they removed this clothing, or by other minor and inadvertent 
breaches of protocol. Masks became the focus of a lengthy and sometimes acrimonious 
debate over whether and to what degree fit-testing was required to make masks 
protective rather than an actual transmitter of infection, whether or not only the N95 
mask (which filters out 95% of all particles larger than 1 micron) was effective in 
preventing transmission, and how to manage the logistics of distribution and fitting.52  
 
In addition to these local measures, from the beginning air travellers were identified as 
a special group in need of intense surveillance. In Canada, all passengers from SARS-
affected countries were issued with a yellow leaflet, and outgoing passengers from 
Toronto with a red leaflet, containing a questionnaire of symptoms and recent activities. 
(These leaflets were available at some land border crossings also). Those that answered 
‘yes’ to any questions were examined by a nurse. By July one million people had 
received the leaflets and 3000 had been examined by a nurse. In addition, 800 000 
people had been thermally scanned for raised temperatures and 200 had been 
examined further. None of these people were sent to seek further medical treatment. 
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As it turned out, between March and May only 5 people infected with SARS entered the 
country, and none were symptomatic whilst flying or in airports.53 Nevertheless air 
travel continued to be a strong focus for concern, as demonstrated by the controversial 
travel advisory issued against Toronto by the WHO (which required thermal scanning be 
implemented at all international airports) and backed by the US Centres for Disease 
Control (CDC).54  
 
These containment measures had enormous negative social impacts, which were later 
decried by some as ‘the problem’ with SARS. Saturation media coverage, especially the 
‘SARS soap’ - the daily 2 pm press briefing - and the disruptions wrought by school 
closures and Easter contributed to a sense of crisis. Quarantine was immensely stressful, 
leading to anxiety attacks, nightmares and raised blood pressure in many subjects.55  
Quarantine also adversely affected already overstrained health resources. Four 
members of the advisory committee were quarantined when one of their number fell ill 
with SARS. Hospitals quickly lost staff with any experience to either illness or 
quarantine.56 Tracking those in quarantine was an enormous undertaking for public 
health officials. The WHO travel advisory against Toronto, which was issued in late April 
as the first outbreak was terminating, sparked off such a large number of self-reported 
‘possibles’ that the masses of data helped obscure the case of the medical student who 
caused the second outbreak in May.57  
 
The new protocols required in health care settings also generated negative impacts. 
More people died from their inability to access full care during this period than died 
from SARS.58 Family members prevented from visiting patients all over Ontario suffered 
anguish. Hospitals felt unable to implement all the Health Department directives, such 
as isolating all inpatients with fever or respiratory symptoms. Several family doctors 
were infected by their patients, leading to (highly unsatisfactory to all parties) 
discussions as to what protective clothing family doctors should use, and how it should 
be distributed to them.59  
 
And, as in other health scares, the impact of SARS soon came to be significantly 
measured in economic terms. Airlines were nearly bankrupted.60 Tourism to Ontario 
was decimated – one health professional recalled staying at one of Toronto’s major 
hotels, which was entirely vacant. Chinatown was emptied of shoppers and restaurant 
goers, with many Torontonians identifying as asian or of asian descent complaining of 
feeling stigmatized.61 Nurses and their families also felt socially isolated by nervous 
workmates and were refused service by frightened shopkeepers or taxi drivers. 
Quarantined workers and their industries lost significant income. Government spending 
on the crisis put a strain on the next budget. So prominent were concerns about the 
economic impact of SARS that by the end of April the provincial government was already 
planning a multi-million dollar tourism promotion campaign (whose message was 
mostly loss in the outbreak of SARS II),62 and consequently being accused of taking 
containment measures too lightly in order to minimize lost revenue. 
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SARS turned out not to be highly contagious, nor especially virulent in healthy people 
aged under 65. In the end, about 250 people were infected, and 44 died, a very small 
number in comparison with (for example) preventable deaths from tobacco smoking or 
road accidents.  On reflection, therefore, government and health professionals 
sometimes feel that there was a great disparity between SARS’ actual severity, and the 
impacts of the outbreak. They sought answers as to why this had occurred at the 
commissions of inquiry, where many criticisms were aired over issues specific to the 
situation (eg, how fast information was gathered and relayed to the scientific advisory 
committee) and about whether different communication methods might have calmed 
public fears (eg, whether the daily press briefings calmed or raised concern).63  
 
Many of the particular answers profferred by the stakeholders involved do explain 
particular problems and will no doubt be useful in emergency preparedness planning in 
Ontario and elsewhere, but only one person queried the logic of the response. Dr 
Richard Schabas, a former Chief Medical Officer of Health in the province and now Chief 
of Staff of a SARS affected hospital, questioned the use and extent of quarantine and 
contact tracing during SARS on the basis that epidemiologically, the disease had never 
looked like a highly contagious epidemic, even in Guangdong. Quarantine was also 
criticized for being at best, a poorly understood and at worst largely useless infection 
control instrument. Its imposition was rather arbitrary,64 its length – and its subjects - 
being determined by social rather than scientific factors65. Further, tracing the epidemic 
curve – a primary epidemiological tool – showed the outbreak had peaked and was 
declining by the end of March.66 Though he himself also acted on the principle of 
precaution, entering voluntary quarantine throughout the duration of his holiday in 
France when he became aware that SARS had entered his hospital around the time he 
left Canada, Schabas was publicly skeptical of what he saw as a kind of disaster mindset 
in the scientific advisory committee: ‘you can worry about the hundred year flood every 
time it starts to rain.’67 Schabas felt fears of worst-case scenarios and of unlikely 
contingencies were being chosen over the more minimal rationales of suggested by risk 
assessment. In my terms, the scientific advisory committee was trying to eliminate all 
potential sources of danger, rather than accepting the possible casualties of an 
approach based on calculating probabilities. And the committee felt justified when the 
second outbreak in May, SARS II, occurred after two full incubation periods had passed 
with no new cases, transmitted by a medical student - this was exactly the kind of tiny 
probability / high consequence event they were worried about.68 (I make no judgement 
as to who - if anyone - was ‘right). 
 
The year before SARS, West Nile virus had come to Canada for the first time amid 
discussions of the consequences of global warming. In May 2003 the case of BSE that led 
to the US closing its borders to Canadian beef, with devastating effects, was discovered. 
And directly after SARS II, the eastern seaboard was struck by a major blackout 
attributed to faults in Canada’s aging energy delivery infrastructure, leaving 
Torontonians feeling that the future was indeed one of likely catastrophe.69 Amid the 
risk society, the logic of dangerousness continued to inform reactions to many 
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immediate crises, as the mass slaughter of cattle in Alberta and, in early 2004, birds in 
British Columbia to annihilate avian influenza – a sort of final solution or pre-emptive 
strike - sadly demonstrated. 
 
VI. The ‘new normal’? An insecure conclusion 
 
"We are living in a new normal … The old days where an infection might emerge every 
now and again and capture our attention really has changed." Dr Julie Gerberding, 
Director, US Centres for Disease Control, February 25, 200470  
 
‘[I]t is time to return to the old standbys to combat SARS: wash hands frequently, stay 
home when sick and avoid hand shakes and other similar physical contacts during flu 
season. "You've heard of the 'new normal'?" Patrick asks. "Well, that's a bit of a 
misnomer. It's actually the old normal."’ Dr David Patrick, director of epidemiology at 
the British Columbia Centre for Disease Control, October 14, 200371  
 
Since SARS - since 9/11 - it seems we are living in a ‘new normal’. The term has had wide 
circulation in the media and in specialist circles after both the attacks on the World 
Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 and after SARS. It is impossible to dissociate SARS 
from 9/11 – both are consistently used, often together, as emblems for the novel, 
catastrophic threats that North America and the ‘west’ are considered to be facing. The 
words ‘new normal’ speak to the new discourses of (in)security and the methods used 
to combat danger in an era defined by these two events. Responses to SARS in North 
America have resembled those of the Bush administration to 9/11 in some important 
literal and discursive ways: minute and scrupulous border patrol, the notion that 
security is vested in and reinforces the nation / ‘homeland’, the imposition of governing 
power - the sword - to find and neutralise danger.  
 
In the US after 9/11 the ‘new normal’ is a state of constant insecurity and instability. 
Originally used well over a decade ago to refer to perceived new instabilities in global 
economies,72 the term has come to refer particularly (though not exclusively) to 
terrorism.73 One of the most central and public responses has been to step up border 
control in order to identify and exclude dangerous individuals. Air travellers have been 
especially targeted and monitored, as anyone who has spent hours in the queues to be 
fingerprinted at US airports or filled out an identification card for merely passing 
through US air space without landing can attest. The other chief instruments have been 
the doctrine of ‘pre-emptive strikes’ and the detaining of terror suspects, which - apart 
from any other considerations - are similarly based on the logic of dangerousness. 
Consider the close resemblance between these concerns and the question Foucault 
described as preoccupying law enforcement in the nineteenth century: how do we 
prevent the terrible crimes of the pathological murder, a person who by definition 
seems utterly normal until they commit their dreadful acts? Only by identifying and 
neutralising them before they do so. My argument is that now just as then, the sense of 
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insecurity has seen instruments based on the logic of dangerousness not merely 
complementing, but often intruding in or replacing, those based on risk. 
 
The ‘new normal’ means more than fears of terror - it connotes a more generalised 
sense of being under constant potential threat. The author of one article, lamenting the 
lost innocence of her children in the year of the world trade center attacks, the anthrax 
letters, reports of child abductions, war and shooting deaths, summed up the ‘new 
normal’ as ‘a sniper day’.74 This state of insecurity requires constant vigilance and 
preparedness in response, made manifest in the increased calls for emergency 
preparedness, plans that require citizens to be constantly alert also. The American Red 
Cross, for example, has produced a new initiative called ‘Together We Prepare’, which 
‘champions Individual Preparedness’. The initiative ‘empowers people to prepare 
themselves, their homes, schools, businesses, and neighbourhoods for the 
unexpected.’75 This sense of a novel insecurity and the requirement to be prepared 
continue to be echoed in the economic realms, where airlines are told that they have hit 
a ‘new norm, where crises like war and health scares are no longer unusual blips to be 
quickly forgotten, but a permanent part of the business cycle’,76 and business are 
exhorted to put in place their own plans for management in the event of a terrorist 
attack or outbreak of disease. 
 
In Toronto, the ‘new normal’ refers particularly to health issues. In its broadest terms, it 
refers to the context of new and re-emerging diseases that are believed to pose novel 
and terrifying threats to western societies, alongside terrorism. Insofar as SARS 
represented this threat, border patrols and detaining the dangerous have likewise been 
central instruments. This is literal - one of the outcomes of SARS has been the alteration 
and strengthening of old national and provincial Quarantine Acts.77 Air travellers were 
identified as a population in need of particular surveillance, both through self-report 
and through screening. The discursive fit between border patrol and security was so 
close that Ontario’s provincial health minister during SARS, Tony Clement, made more 
extensive thermal and health screening at all borders an election promise,78 despite the 
fact that this measure was extremely expensive and utterly useless during SARS, and 
estimations that in general 1 in 8 travellers experience respiratory infections that could 
lead to detainment before a SARS diagnosis could be ruled out.79 
 
During and after the outbreak, however, the term ‘the new normal’ had more specific 
meanings, referring to (1) new directives for infection control within hospitals,80 and (2) 
a call for all members of the public to a return to the principles and practices of basic 
hygiene, which were considered to have lapsed under conditions of false security.81 
(These were emphasized in the emergency preparedness plans for businesses, also).82 
The new directives aimed specifically for hospital infection control had been issued and 
updated by the Ontario Ministry for health during the course of the outbreak, and 
centred on more scrupulous sterilization procedures, the wearing of new multiple layers 
of protective clothing and especially fit-tested N95 masks, and the isolation in negative 
pressure rooms of all patients with fever or respiratory illness. Although they were 
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devised in part to respond to the fears of frontline health care workers, these directives 
were initially found unworkable in existing hospital conditions and with existing 
resources, and since then have been revised with input from public health officials, 
doctors and nurses.83 This ‘new normal’ of increased vigilance over a range of tiny 
details that formerly went unscrutinised – a hospital version of border security – 
continues to be operational.84 
 
In both contexts, all sides agree that security comes at the price of a vanishing 
innocence. Practitioners wonder if they should greet all their patients swathed in 
greens, their faces sweating and itchy, their expressions masked: "The bare-faced 
examiner of coughing children should be considered an image of the past, seen only in 
Norman Rockwell paintings of a simpler time," wrote one doctor. "Believe me it's not 
ideal, and if I had the choice I wouldn't be doing it. But I think we have an obligation to 
protect ourselves and our patients given what we know,” commented another.85 Many 
physicians, underscoring the impossibility of perfect danger control, were pragmatic: 
 
I'll have to try to figure out what to do when I get to work. It looks like we're going 
to have the sign-in sheets for everyone, and I have masks and alcohol gel at the 
front door for patients. I still don't know if I should be wearing a mask all the time - 
they're very uncomfortable. I think I'll have a look at what the patient has written 
on the sheet before entering the room, and put on a mask if I'm worried. Not very 
high tech, but I hope it works. 
I guess this is the new normal I've been hearing about.86  
 
The truly healthy subject-citizen of the ‘new normal’ is a person who not only exercises 
a disciplined and responsible autonomy, managing and minimizing the risks to their 
health from their lifestyle, as described by Lupton, Petersen and others,87 but is 
someone who is also constantly vigilant for catastrophe, and immediately obedient to 
the return of older forms of imposed government in such situations. And the new era of 
emergency preparedness sees the eruption of old fashioned, imposed, face to face 
techniques of locating and averting danger – border controls, quarantine, isolation, 
mandated hygiene - alongside the continued operation of the managerial machinery of 
surveillance and risk. The dilemmas on both sides remain: the impossibility of locating 
and neutralising all dangerous individuals and objects in real time, the inappropriateness 
of making judgments based on risk calculations where mistakes cost lives in a crisis.   
 
Health scares like SARS can be profitably understood as the outcome of these dilemmas. 
They are, perhaps, to be expected in a world discursively and instrumentally 
preoccupied with emergency preparedness - or if not that, then as the outcome of the 
principle of precaution followed by health professionals conscious of the weight of their 
responsibilities. Often, like SARS, they are shaped by the tensions between the realities 
of a globalising world - fast and common travel, investment in global information 
systems - and our continued social and governmental reliance on nation states. There 
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are many who, seeing this, dissent from the border-patrolling version of security to 
argue that a better response is to reinvest in public health systems that will have the 
capacity to respond in the event of a pandemic in western nations, and to alleviating the 
conditions of social inequality, poverty and environmental devastation that are 
identified as the conditions under which new threats to health emerge. ‘The final resting 
place where things will end up, or what they call a new normal, certainly hasn't been 
determined yet’, as one doctor said.88 It's really just a question of where we are going to 
draw the lines. 
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